



Research in Social Sciences and Technology

**EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: TRADITIONALIST PARADIGM
AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION**

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Abstract

In the first decade of the twentieth century the discipline of political science was in its nascent stage. Political science professors of that period focused their research primarily on the study of the state or the nation-state. They espoused a worldview that may be called Traditionalism. Traditionalist paradigm was informed by Hegelian philosophy of the primacy of the state. Their academic research and professional mission paid little attention to social issues of the period such as racial segregation, income inequality, women's right to vote, and poverty. Traditionalist political scientists promoted teaching about the structure and function of government on college campuses and in public schools packaging it as citizenship education. However, political scientists of the mid-1920s and early 1930s found Traditionalism to be an inadequate methodology for explaining the complex political problems of a rapidly changing society.

Keywords: Political science, state, traditionalism, government, academic discipline, citizenship education

Introduction

The history of American political science may be divided into three broad phases: Traditionalism, Behavioralism, and Post-behavioralism (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Gunnell 1990; Easton 1991). Each phase is characterized by political scientists' assumptions about the social and political order in America. This paper explores the historical context of the first phase of American political science. In doing so, it discusses the enduring legacy of Traditionalism, its inadequacies, and its implications for American democracy and civic life.

The Traditionalist phase was introduced in the late nineteenth century by the founding fathers of the discipline with the establishment of political science programs in colleges and universities (Haddow 1939; Crick 1959; Waldo 1975; Gunnell 1990, 1991). The most instrumental founders were those who studied in Prussia and were influenced by Hegelian conservatism. Upon their return to the United States, the Prussian-trained American political

scientists placed the nation-state “at the top as the consummation and culmination, and also the basis of all other institutions” (Dewey 1982, p. 194).

State-centricism became so pervasive in American political science discourse that John Dewey, a renowned philosopher of education, called it an “industry” of which Hegel was “a striking example” (Dewey 1982, p. 194). Nonetheless, for Dewey, such deep commitment to the state-centric approach was dogmatic on the part of its adherents because they made the state to be “a supreme end in itself” (p. 196). Commenting on the Hegelian influence on American political scientists, Dewey posits:

Naturally, inevitably, the students of political science have been preoccupied with this great historic phenomenon, and their intellectual activities have been directed to its systematic formulation. Because the contemporary progressive movement was to establish the unified state against the inertia of minor social units and against the ambitions of rivals for power, political theory developed the dogma of the sovereignty of the national state, internally and externally. (p. 195)

Hence, some of the Traditionalists’ primary missions were the study of the state, the preparation of administrators for government, and the creation of a passive citizenry (Leonard 1999, 750). Because of their innate interest in the state, political scientists considered the teaching of government in both colleges and school their central obligation. Moreover, Traditionalists founded the APSA in 1903, which for several decades made systematic efforts to foster the teaching of government-related courses in public schools. Describing the academic background of the APSA founders, Peter Manicas (1987) suggests that “almost half those holding positions in the American Political Science Association had been German-trained” (p. 219). The mission of the German-trained Traditionalist scholars was the “Americanization of political science” (Manicas 1987, 219). It is particularly notable that the Traditionalist perspective in the APSA considered the teaching of government as political science education. Indeed, it was this legacy, which continued for decades in the high school social studies curricula of most states. Some critics identified the legacy as “conservative cultural continuity” (Haas 1979, 151).

Recognizing Traditionalism as the core value of political science, social science historian Dorothy Ross (1991) argues that “The discipline of [political science] entered the 1920s with its conservative traditionalism still visible” (p. 448). Ross’s study suggests that in comparison with other social sciences, political science was relatively slower in recognizing and embracing social and scientific change. The discipline of psychology, for example, was well ahead of political science in incorporating scientific methods in its research. It was therefore psychology that Charles E. Merriam of the University of Chicago emulated, and he urged his fellow political scientists to follow its methods.

Merriam took over the presidency of the APSA in 1925. Merriam sought to steer the political science discipline away from Traditionalism and towards social science. Because most APSA members were trained in Traditionalism, Merriam’s ascendancy to power did not shake the old school entirely. Inspired by advances made in the sister social sciences, especially psychology and sociology, Merriam sought to introduce the social science research methods into political science. Psychology was Merriam’s “chief interest and his scientific Trojan horse” (Ross 1991, 452). Merriam’s insistence on the use of the social science research methods was a repudiation of the comparative-historical method heretofore used by Traditionalists.

In the mid-1920s, Merriam inaugurated the Behavioralist phase in political science. However, the Behavioralist movement gained popularity only after the Second World War. Behavioralist political scientists parted ways with Traditionalism by curtailing their professional commitment to the study of the state and the fostering of the teaching of government in schools.

Unlike Traditionalists, who emphasized the teaching of government, Behaviorists undertook the task of making political science a genuine science by emulating the methods of the natural sciences. In their pursuit of achieving scientific rigor through empirical testing,

Behavioralists took scant interest in normative activities, such as the education of democratic citizens.

As a research paradigm, Behavioralism later gained a small amount of respect among the high school social studies textbook writers. Several textbooks for senior grades, including *American Political Behavior* by Howard D. Mehlinger and John J. Patrick (1971), incorporated the Behavioralist conception. By the late 1960s, the Behavioralist perspective was less appealing to certain dissident groups within the APSA. Leftists, feminists and members of the racial minority groups in the APSA challenged the positivist mission of the Behavioralist paradigm. This internal revolt in the APSA ushered political science into an amorphous third phase, Post-behavioralism, which continued into the late twentieth century.

Traditionalism of the Founding Fathers of Political Science

Traditionalism, a conservative theoretical framework, is primarily concerned with the study of the state. Traditionalism is also known by other expressions, including *realism*, *conservatism*, and *state-centeredness*. In the late nineteenth century, four individuals with Traditionalist orientations set the stage for institutionalizing political science as an academic discipline: Francis Lieber, Woodrow Wilson, John W. Burgess, and Frank J. Goodnow.

Each one of these luminaries contributed in a major way to the development of political science. Lieber was the first scholar who assumed a faculty position as a professional political scientist at Columbia College. Wilson was the first elected vice president of the APSA in 1904; he declined the position, but served the organization as its fourth president several years later. Burgess was a political scientist who founded the School of Political Science at Columbia College in 1880. Goodnow, a professor of administrative law at Columbia University, was elected as the first president of the APSA in 1903 and was a close associate of Burgess at Columbia College.

A common passion of the four scholars was their commitment to the study of the state. Political science to them was *staatswissenschaft*, or the science of the state, an idea introduced into American political science by German-born scholar Francis Lieber and also later discovered by American students in the late nineteenth century when they studied at Prussian universities (Haddow 1939; Brown 1950; Crick 1959; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Ross 1991). This idea reified the state into an entity that was higher in status than civil society and citizens. In the state-centric conceptual scheme, citizens paid their allegiance to the state and in return derived from it their rights and privileges.

Moreover, all founding fathers of political science were academicians fascinated by the concept of the state. They all considered the state a historical reality warranting a careful and systematic study. They perceived their work to be more than an exercise in speculative philosophy—for them the study of the state was a scientific enterprise. Moreover, for them the subject matter and method of political science differentiated it from history and other social sciences: they considered political science a distinct field of study. Because they viewed human affairs from the prism of the state, their approach to social, political, and economic problems may be termed as state-centric.

From their perspective, the state was an extraordinary and most vital institution. The historical and essential function of this institution was to provide protection for citizens against external aggression. They considered the state to be a ubiquitous and omnipresent creature worthy of adulation. Since, in their view, the state was a timeless entity, its significance transcended other transient human organizations or parochial interests. The government formed the nucleus of the state.

They considered learning about the machinery of government essential for citizenship and citizenship education. It is evident from their ideas and activities that their intellectual

energies were invested mainly in achieving one specific goal: the strengthening of the institution of the state. Indeed, theirs was a conservative enterprise.

At least two of these individuals, Lieber and Burgess, belonged to that class of American scholars who had studied political science in Germany (Merriam 1925). This is not to suggest, however, that before the arrival of the German-trained American scholars the state had never been theorized about in a systematic fashion in the United States. James Madison's "Federalist No.10," which proposed the theory of interest groups, may be designated as the seminal empirical approach to the study of the state in America. Madison's analysis of politics was empirical in that he stressed "the evidence of known facts" and jettisoned speculation by "theoretic politicians" (Madison [1787] 1961).

What was remarkable about the German-trained American political scientists, however, was their commitment to establish separate academic programs for the systematic study of the state. Initially, the goals of the programs included the preparation of bureaucrats for the government (Leonard 1995, 77). Programs in political science at Johns Hopkins and Columbia Universities were two such examples.

In the late nineteenth century, the term political science was not very popular in the United States or elsewhere in the Western world (Crick 1959). Perhaps one or two colleges may have offered political science as a course. Separate textbooks on political science were rarely published. In 1877, Theodore Dwight Woolsey, a disciple of Lieber and President of Yale University, authored a textbook, *Political Science: Or, the State Theoretically and Practically Considered*.

It is probable that Woolsey's book may have been the first systematic study of the state by an academician that was used as a textbook. In *Encyclopedia Americana*, James Garner noted that Woolsey's textbook was a "systematic presentation of the principles of political science which has appeared from the pen of an American" (cited in Haddow 1939, 241). This

suggests that in the late nineteenth century, political science was a newly introduced academic discipline for the study of the state, having its own peculiar language, theories, principles, and methods that were different from fields like economics, history, or law (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Waldo 1975). Leonard D. White (1993) maintains that “in 1900 there were in the United States not more than 100 men and women who would recognize themselves professionally as political scientists” (p. 223). White also suggests that “the hand of German scholarship was still heavy upon our ‘infant industry’” (p. 224). Indeed, this was not the case with other social sciences, such as sociology and economics.

Francis Lieber

Of the four founding fathers, Lieber, a Prussian émigré, was the first scholar to introduce political science into the United States. Lieber arrived in the United States in 1827 and developed friendships with the Whig elites of Boston. In the early 1830s, when a young French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, visited the United States, Lieber was one of the scholars with whom he exchanged ideas about American democracy. The two held conflicting views about the American social order (Ross 1991, 41). Whereas Lieber’s worldview was state-centric, Tocqueville was impressed with a robust civil society in America.

Examining Lieber’s scholarly influence on academia, Ross (1991) argues that “Exploiting the resonances between German understanding of the state and American Whig culture, Francis Lieber forged a lasting link between the two in American political science” (p. 38). Hence, the construction of a seminal state-centric theoretical framework of American political science can be attributed to Francis Lieber. Lieber’s state-centricism fostered a counter-majoritarian vision of citizenship in the political science discipline.

The focal point of Lieber’s vision of citizenship was “the Whig tradition of limited democracy” (Ross 1991, 258). Ross illustrates the prevalence of Lieber’s counter-majoritarian conservative approach in political science by citing J. Franklin Jameson, a student at Johns

Hopkins University. Jameson wrote in his diary that, “Every political meeting I have attended has had the same effect, to shatter my rising respect for the people, in their political capacity, and make me despise them” (p. 259). Jameson’s academic training in Lieberian political science shows the discipline’s orientation toward limited public participation in the political process.

Lieber’s *Civil Liberty and Self Government* (1853) earned him the Chair of History and Political Science at Columbia College in 1858. In his inaugural address, Lieber (1858) not only explained the purpose of political science in American society but also articulated his conception of citizenship, citizenship education, and social order from his state-centric Traditionalist worldview. Lieber stressed three points.

First, he argued that self-government for citizens was derived exclusively from the state. Second, public schools should teach the young about liberty, justice, and political truth. And finally, Lieber declared communism and extreme individualism utopian because they ignored the realities of the role of the state in the lives of citizens.

According to Lieber, “Man cannot divest himself of the state” (Lieber 1880, in Farr and Seidelman 1993, 22). The state was a reality—citizens owed their liberty and rights to the state. Rights and obligations did not exist outside the state. It was thus incumbent upon citizens to respect the supreme status and authority of the state. Citizens would do so by being patriotic. According to Lieber, patriotism was a positive virtue entailing the love of one’s country but not the hatred of others. Patriotism also required the fostering of individual liberty, justice, and truth in politics.

Lieber asserted that it was thus necessary for public schools to teach children about the values of liberty, justice, and truth. In other words, the essential components of Lieber’s conception of citizenship and citizenship education were the values of liberty, justice, and truth. The notions of individual liberty and justice were, of course, not new concepts and had been part of the Western philosophical discourse for centuries.

The idea of truth in politics was certainly a new addition to the discourse. Lieber defined “truth in politics” as statistical facts about political life; that is to say, citizens needed to be knowledgeable on political issues. For Lieber, the scientific analysis of politics demanded facts. Science was thus considered a tool for discovering truth about public life and hence for strengthening good citizenship. In order to preserve liberty and justice, citizens needed to know the truth.

Lieber characterized political science as “the very science for nascent citizens of a republic” (Lieber 1881, 1: 343). According to Lieber, the teaching and learning of good citizenship values in schools were made possible by the use of the scientific approach to political life. By this, he meant that unless citizens were familiar with the statistical facts, they could not make intelligent political decisions. In other words, to achieve true individual liberty and justice, citizens needed to learn the principles of political science. Hence, for Lieber, the public school was the most important place for the teaching of political science.

John W. Burgess

John William Burgess founded the School of Political Science at Columbia College in 1880. The year 1880 symbolizes the formal birth of political science (Waldo 1975). Burgess had studied law at the University of Berlin and was influenced by Hegel’s conservative philosophy. Under Burgess’s leadership, the School of Political Science attracted well-known scholars. Historian James Harvey Robinson and political scientists William A. Dunning and Herbert Osgood were some of Burgess’s colleagues at Columbia. By 1900, Columbia offered one of the most rigorous programs in political science in the United States, sowing the seeds of the Traditionalist paradigm. Ross (1991) suggests that, “The atmosphere was especially conservative at Columbia, under John W. Burgess” (p. 259).

Burgess was a strong proponent of conservatism, nationalism, and supremacy of the white race. Writing in Hegelian tradition, Burgess sought to apply the German concepts of the

state, sovereignty, and citizenship to American conditions. According to Burgess, the state was a Western concept. It was the “product of the progressive revelation of the human reason through history” (Burgess 1890, 50). This suggests that history had rendered the prior forms of human organization obsolete. The state was an expression of human rationality and it was here to stay.

In his *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel had defined the state as a “divine will as a present spirit” (Hegel 1949, 240-1). Hegel’s definition suggests that the state’s will precedes the will of the people. The state was sovereign and had an absolute power that could not be challenged. Concurring with Hegel, Burgess posited that “we must hold to the principle that the state can do no wrong” (Burgess 1890, 50). Burgess’s ideas favoring the hegemony of the state were certainly unrestrained. His vision of the state bordered on tyranny. One may argue that Burgess was an apologist for an unrestrained Leviathan.

As an ultra-nationalist, Burgess advocated the superiority of the Teutonic race. To Burgess, the people of the Teutonic race were superior to those of the Slavonic and Roman races because they were “particularly endowed with the capacity for establishing nation states, and are especially called to work, and therefore, they are entrusted, in the general economy of history, with the mission of conducting the political civilization of the modern world” (Burgess 1909, 22).

Burgess was a self-proclaimed racist and imperialist who argued that the state had the right to protect its distinctiveness by selecting its immigrants on the basis of their racial identity. He recommended that all immigration of Czechs, Hungarians, and Italians be cut off because they were inclined to anarchy and crime.

In his view, the immigrants from southeastern Europe were socialists and atheists and not suitable for the American society (Burgess 1895). He suggested that America perfect its

political civilization with a Teutonic population, and not “pollute” itself with non-Teutonic people.

For Burgess, because the Teutonic race had the best mental attitude for democratic systems of government, it should colonize the rest of the world so that barbarians may be taught rights and duties (Burgess 1896). Later in his *Reminiscences of an American Scholar*, Burgess (1934) admired Lieber’s *Political Science and Comparative Law* by noting:

I would say that the book represents the Teutonic nations—the English, French, Lombards, Scandinavians, Germans and North Americans—as the great modern nation builders, that it represents the national State, that is, the self-conscious democracy, as the ultima Thule of political history; that it justifies the temporary imposition of Teutonic order on unorganized, disorganized, or savage people for the sake of their own civilization and their incorporation in the world society; that it therefore justifies the colonial system of the British Empire especially; that it favors federal government, and finally, that it extols above everything the system of individual immunity against governmental power formulated in the Constitution of the United States and upheld and protected by the independent judiciary. (p. 254-5)

From the above statement, it appears that Burgess admired Lieber as a fellow imperialist. In Burgess’s view, imperialism was not only desirable—it was historically inevitable and morally defensible. Indeed, according to Burgess, imperialism was the only panacea for saving the non-white populations of the world from self-destruction. Burgess’s statement implies that since the non-white peoples of the world were barbaric, imperialism would bring about social change by introducing law and order through the administrative machinery of the nation-state.

Burgess’s imperialist worldview about traditional societies contains erroneous assumptions, however. Both Lieber and Burgess formed their opinions about the non-European societies because of their Eurocentric perspective, rather than verifiable data. Moreover, one may raise the question: Is it the administrative structure of a state system alone that makes people civilized? In their reductionist framework, it seems that for Lieber and Burgess, the state

was the sole civilizing agent and that, without invoking the state and its attendant machinery, societies suffered from anarchy and chaos. They suggested that it was due to the absence of the state system that non-European societies were disorganized.

In his statement, Burgess extols organized governments in European societies. He also prescribes the same for the non-European societies. Nonetheless, as Charles Tilly (1975) has argued, the creation of the nation-state system in Europe was a process of social transformation involving massive depredation, violence, and bloodshed. That is to say, the creation of the nation-state in Europe was hardly a picnic.

Burgess failed to realize that, as a European construct, the notion of the nation-state system might not be universally applicable. Indeed, what appealed to Burgess in the idea of the nation-state was its organizational aspect, i.e. its core values of order and stability. Nonetheless, it was on the basis of race that Burgess supported the idea of imperialism. In his view, American imperialism was justified because the higher civilization of the United States must be shared with the backward peoples. In short, Burgess Americanized Rudyard Kipling's theory of the White Man's Burden, urging the European race to colonize non-European people and their lands. In his scheme, the nation-state was simply an efficient mechanism that facilitated the white man's paternalistic domination over indigenous populations of non-European societies.

Woodrow Wilson

Wilson held a prominent place in the political science community. He was elected as fourth president of the APSA. His works on leadership and the science of administration were seminal contributions to research on the study of the state (Wilson 1885, 1887, 1889). By the late nineteenth century, Wilson's *Congressional Government: A Study of American Politics* (1885) was one of the most popular works in political science. It was reprinted eighteen times. Wilson's thesis was that government by Congress was a menace and therefore the President

should be more powerful than a bunch of bickering politicians in the House and Senate (Wilson 1885).

In Wilson's view, the public was unruly and incapable of governing themselves and, hence, their participation in the decision making process had to be restricted. Wilson's conception of restricted democracy and citizenship was thus at odds with the majoritarian nature of Jeffersonian democracy.

For Wilson, the most important purpose of political science was the strengthening of the state. Hence, he stressed the importance of the study of "administration" in political science (Wilson 1887). Through the discipline of political science Wilson sought to create a class of professional civil servants who would conduct the affairs of the state in a businesslike manner and who were not easily swayed by their transitory passions. It appears that for Wilson, the American government was inherently a modern entity that was qualitatively different from other forms of governments, like monarchies.

His argument was that the modern age was defined by specialization. The state, being a modern organization, needed a specialized and rational class of individuals for whom the state's interest preceded other subjective interests. Conceptually, Wilson's perspective on the needs of a modern state was close to Hegel's ideas about the creation of a disinterested universal class. The members of the disinterested universal class are professional bureaucrats who dedicate their lives to the service of the state. Indeed, like other political scientists of his generation, Wilson's ideas were also shaped by the German idealist social philosophy whose teleological goal was "to provide a bulwark for the maintenance of the political *status quo* against the tide of radical ideas coming from revolutionary France. Although Hegel asserted in explicit form that the end of states and institutions is to further the realization of the freedom of all, his effect was to consecrate the Prussian [S]tate and to enshrine bureaucratic absolutism" (Dewey 1982,

188). Thus, Wilson justified a pivotal role for a strong bureaucracy that was committed to the strengthening of the state.

Indeed, the overarching theme in Wilson's writings is the primacy of the state. This is not to suggest that all of Wilson's writings were about this theme. Nonetheless, as a political scientist, as well as a contributor to the popular press, his undivided attention seems to be focused on questions related to the state and the concomitant issues of government and administration.

It appears that by paying a disproportionate amount of attention to the interests of the state, Wilson inevitably—and perhaps deliberately—relegated a secondary status to fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy, justice, and equality, in his political writings. As a politician and a world statesman, Wilson had unquestionably championed the liberal causes of democracy and self-determination for millions of people. However, his inordinate level of celebration of the state and an unwavering faith in it as a panacea for human progress certainly eclipsed his commitments to liberal causes.

For Wilson, the state was represented by government, and the essential characteristic of government was “force” (Wilson, *The State*, 29, [cited in Padover]). In Wilson's view, “Government, in its last analysis, is organized force.” The state was thus conceived in a masculine, dominant, autonomous, and intrusive form that was different from a civil society that was conceived as having feminine characteristics. In contrast with the state, the civil society in this conception was understood to hold a subordinate position and to need protection by the state.

Frank J. Goodnow

As the first elected APSA president, Goodnow's ideas represented the official mission of professional political scientists. In his inaugural address to APSA members in 1904,

Goodnow articulated the organization's aims and agenda. He declared that political science dealt with a subject that other "American scientific associations" had ignored. That subject was the "state." According to Goodnow, "Political science is that science which treats of organization known as the State. It is at the same time, so to speak, a science of statics and a science of dynamics. It has to do with the State at rest and with the State in action" (Goodnow 1904, 37).

Goodnow argued, "the American Historical Association had treated the state incidentally" (1904, 36). Moreover, in Goodnow's view, the members of the American Historical Association who studied the state at all had focused only on the states of the past and not the states of the contemporary era. Hence, the study of the state and its functions was the responsibility of the APSA members.

Similarly, Goodnow argued that the members of the American Economic Association dealt with the state, but only when it concerned the administration of the tax collection system. Professional economists were interested in the study of production and distribution of goods. They hardly studied the organization of government, the policy making process, and the distribution of power in various branches of government.

Goodnow pointed out that, like the American Historical Association and the American Economics Association, other professional associations also did not study the structure and function of the state. Goodnow thus drew a line of demarcation between political science and history and economics, its two most formidable competitors in the academic marketplace.

An adherent of pragmatism, Goodnow was less interested in abstract theories than in their practical applications. He had carved himself a separate niche in the discipline of political science known as public administration, earning the title of the founding father of the subfield of public administration in political science.

For Goodnow, the goal of political science was the study of the state in three aspects: (1) the expression of the will of the state, (2) the content of the will of the state, and (3) the execution of the will of the state. The first referred to political action by parties, the second to the legal system, and the third to the enforcement of law (Goodnow 1900).

It appears that Goodnow had emphasized the primacy of the will of the state. However, little is mentioned in his framework about the citizens' will. Perhaps he may have identified the citizens' will with the will of the state. On the other hand, perhaps, he did not see a conflict between the two.

Burgess and Goodnow: Two Orientations in Early Political Science

John William Burgess and Frank Johnson Goodnow, the two major founding fathers of American political science, represented divergent orientations in the discipline. Dorothy Ross (1991) classifies the two orientations as "Hegelianism" and "realist historicism" respectively (p. 71, 274-5).

Hegelians were those who believed that the state was the product of the progressive revelation of human reason through history and that liberty could be attained only through the institutions of the state (Ross 1991, 71). From his Hegelian perspective, Burgess had declared that the modern nation-state was the creation of Teutonic political genius and that social change could not affect this fundamental principle (p. 72). For Burgess, the American political system was simply a historical continuation of the legacy of the Teutonic races. Goodnow refuted Burgess's thesis of Teutonic nations' contributions and instead focused his attention on the study of the technical realities of municipal government.

Goodnow was a historical realist in that he studied the role of political parties, administration, and city government issues that older political scientists considered less

significant for study (Ross 1991, 274). Like other historical realists, Goodnow was interested in the realistic analysis of public institutions, and not in idealistic speculation.

Goodnow was Burgess's student at Amherst College and Columbia University, but developed major ideological disagreements with his teacher on fundamental theoretical questions. The two also worked as colleagues on the political science faculty at Columbia University. John D. Millett (1955) posits that Burgess and Goodnow were giants of American scholarship in the early development of graduate study in the field of government; they gave Columbia its distinctive reputation (p. 259).

Although the two scholars were Traditionalists in that they studied the state, Goodnow's worldview was also influenced by the Progressive movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unlike Burgess, who stressed the continuation of the Anglo-Saxon heritage in political and social values, the future-oriented Goodnow, sought to bring about reforms in municipal and national governments. Whereas Burgess's Hegelian approach to political science stressed historical analysis, Goodnow sought to draw political scientists' attention to the need for municipal reforms.

Moreover, while Burgess's theoretical perspective emanated from his historicist thesis about the reconstruction of the past, Goodnow moved beyond the "gentry conception of fixed American principle," and argued his case for making political science relevant to the political realities of the time (Ross 1991, 283). On the question of women's education in universities, little is known about Goodnow's views, but Burgess was quite vocal on the subject: He vehemently opposed women's enrollment in the department of political science at Columbia. In his view, women caused distraction for men and therefore did not belong in the political science classrooms.

Because Burgess disliked coeducation, on one occasion, he also clashed with Seth Low, the president of Columbia University (Hoxie 1955, 64). When President Low allowed women

to audit courses, Burgess wrote a letter to Low noting that “the admission of ladies would be a disturbing element” (Hoxie 1955, 65). He did not, however, oppose the establishment of a separate college for women. Unlike Burgess, who repudiated social change, Goodnow’s ideas and work may be characterized as progressive in orientation. Goodnow was also an activist reformer who worked closely with revisionist historian Charles A. Beard. In 1903, when Goodnow launched the American Political Science Association, Burgess ignored Goodnow’s efforts and the activities of the new organization.

Traditionalist Vision and Citizenship Education

It is evident from the writings of the four founding fathers of political science that they espoused a state-centric Traditionalist political philosophy. Indeed, in the context of liberal democracy, such conception had implications for citizenship and citizenship education. That is to say, the Traditionalists’ ideological influence over the APSA’s activities in the pre-collegiate setting manifested itself in the form of curricular recommendations for the government course. In addition, because their Traditionalism echoed the past state-centric conservative voices of Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Hegel, they considered the state to be the highest form of human organization. This meant that they emphasized the bellicose dimension of human nature.

In other words, Traditionalists celebrated the state because it ensured social order, a value that seemed to outweigh other values. Because for an extended period the APSA continued the state-centric legacy, it promoted a paternalist conception of citizenship and citizenship education. Such a conception portrayed stereotypical gender images, including the masculine “toughness, courage, power, independence” of the state (Tickner 1992, 6).

Feminist political scientist J. Ann Tickner (1992) suggests that these virtues essentially valorize “hegemonic masculinity” and hardly convey the women’s experiences (p. 58). Feminist scholar Susan Moller Okin (1998) posits that political scientists’ traditional theories

about citizenship stressed the public virtues of citizens and ignored the domestic virtues of civic life (p. 117). That is why Traditionalist political science not only ignored women's roles in the political community, but also excluded them from the academic profession (Ross 1991, 102).

Indeed, such a conception of women found a green pasture in public schools in the form of the APSA's support for a course on government. It would be safe to assume that when education philosopher Nel Noddings (1991) characterizes traditional citizenship education curriculum as the "warrior model," she refers to the ideological framework of social studies that includes the state-centric high school course on government (p. 69).

Furthermore, the political scientists' overemphasis on the state and state organization, the government, bureaucracy, and administration, presented a prescription that was antithetical to the American values of equality, cultural diversity, and a traditional commitment to civil society. In the Traditionalist conception of citizenship and citizenship education, respect for the state and its organs loomed large. In their conception, the interests of the state overshadowed the interests of individuals, families, and communities.

Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, the founding fathers of political science conceived man as quarrelsome, untrustworthy, greedy, and incapable of living in cooperation with others. Their antidote to this problem was that man must be managed, controlled, and made beholden to an entity that was sovereign, efficient, and secular. This entity would use force to purge dissent and ensure social order.

In essence, then, this entity was to be no other than the Hobbesian Leviathan, or what Richard F. Biesel (1990) has called the Yankee Leviathan. Thomas Hobbes, the first English political philosopher of the seventeenth century, had argued that in the state of nature, life was nasty, brutal, and short. Dissatisfied with the state of nature, men surrendered part of their liberty to a sovereign in exchange for peace and order. Hobbes called this sovereign the Leviathan. This is not to imply that the founding fathers of political science espoused

totalitarianism or authoritarianism. They had simply operationalized their state-centric framework within liberal democracy. However, their ideas can be located on the conservative side of the ideological continuum because they favored a thin or restricted model of democracy in which citizens would enjoy limited access to decision making and decision makers.

In their framework, citizenship is inconceivable without the state. That is to say, citizens must accept the authority of the state as an overarching power and an inescapable reality. Indeed, in their juridical interpretation of citizenship, there probably would be no place for what John Dewey called “a mode of associated living, a conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1916, 87).

John Dewey and Political Scientists: Competing Approaches to Citizenship

John Dewey was critical of the Traditionalist conception of citizenship and citizenship education. Dewey’s humanistic conception of citizenship transcended the territorial boundaries of the state. Although Dewey did not entirely reject the significance of the political dimension of citizens’ lives, he found the state-centric approach to citizenship education less effective. Dewey refuted “the idea of the subordination of the individual to the institution” of the state (p. 99). In this context, Dewey (1983) argued, “we think of the citizen in a political capacity, and sometimes we restrict the idea of being a good citizen to the political relations, duties and responsibilities of the person, his relations to the government of the country as a whole and to his local government. I think that is only a part of good citizenship” (p. 158-9). Surely, learning about the “simple paper knowledge of the government” is “a just a paper preparation” for citizenship (p. 160-1).

For Dewey, the idealization of political institutions diverts students’ attention from understanding the forces that operate behind the functioning of the government. In other words, it is erroneous to assume that instruction about the “machinery” of government produces good

and intelligent citizens. Dewey was highly critical of limiting citizenship education to instruction in the American Constitution and the machinery of government. Dewey (1983) noted, “so we think when we have given information to the students about the structure and workings of the government, we have somehow done our part as educators in preparing them to be good citizens when they enter into public life; to become actual citizens when they go out from the school in the future” (p. 160).

For Dewey, democracy, or citizens’ “associated living” is a countervailing force against the coercive qualities of the state. In an educational context, Dewey’s “associated living” is a concept that rejects paternalism and cultural hegemony of one ethnic group or gender over the others; it respects social heterogeneity and pluralism (p. 87, 94).

Indeed, the founding fathers of political science held a thin or restricted view of democracy. Their view of democracy put less emphasis on “associated living,” “conjoint communicated experience” and the “breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory” (Dewey, 1983, p. 87). They considered such ideas and activities perilous for the American republic.

Whereas the Deweyan idea of “associated living” stresses civic participation and community life as the Rosetta stone of democracy, the restricted or thin view of democracy limits peoples’ true participation in civic life. Wilson had suggested in 1887 that political thinkers had spent 2,000 years addressing the problem of who should make basic decisions for society.

In Wilson’s view, such decision makers were not the citizens but the administrative class of the state. According to Wilson (1887), “administration is the most obvious part of government; it is government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of government, and is of course as old as government itself” (p. 198). Referring to this framework, Dewey (1983) argued that we “leave the students with a feeling that they really did

not have to solve problems; that the problems were solved by the officers of our government and the makers of our Constitution; so that all they have to do is to vote for a good man and attend, perhaps, caucuses” (p. 160). Hence, in Wilson’s state-centric conception of democracy, citizens seem to play a minimalist role in political decision-making.

The writings of Traditionalist political scientists hardly offer any prescription pertaining to the benefits of citizens’ active participation in civil society or how citizens could realize the good life in a participatory democracy. More importantly, it is the Traditionalist conception of the founding fathers of political science that provided the epistemological foundation to the APSA, which guided its campaign for canonizing the teaching of government in the high school social studies curriculum.

Political Science in Colleges

Most historians agree that political science was first formally introduced in academia in 1880 by John Burgess (Merriam 1925; Haddow 1939; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Waldo 1975). In addition to Burgess’s School of Political Science at Columbia College, Johns Hopkins University and the University of Michigan soon began offering advanced level courses in political science.

The Columbia and Johns Hopkins programs became precursors in political science instruction in the United States, however. The two programs emulated the German university model by stressing independent research and discouraging philosophical speculation. Moreover, for research, both schools had borrowed the historical-comparative method from German universities. Although this method was not empirical, it was still considered scientific. The historical-comparative method was used in the study of foreign governments, especially European governments.

The period between 1880 and 1920 was a formative phase for political science in that its identity as a discipline was shaped. During this period, the American Political Science

Association was organized as a professional body and major research publications including the APSA's *Proceedings* and *The American Political Science Review* were launched, in which scholars in political science published their research (Anderson 1939).

By the turn of the century, the number of colleges and universities offering political science and the number of students enrolled in such courses were unknown. However, since the discipline itself was new, it may be assumed that few colleges offered political science as a course. In 1900, the number of "individuals recognizing themselves as professional political scientists hardly exceeded one hundred" (White 1993, 13).

In 1903, all those who parted ways with the American Historical Association and formed the American Political Science Association as a separate entity were not necessarily professional political scientists. Fifty years later, there were 4,000 political scientists teaching in colleges and working in other fields and most of them were APSA members. In the 1950s, about ten regional political science associations had been founded.

From 1902 to 1910, six leading American graduate schools conferred fifty-four degrees. Between 1911 and 1920, thirteen graduate schools granted approximately 125 Ph.D. degrees in political science. In the 1920s, 296 Ph.D. degrees were granted. Most of those who earned Ph.D. degrees sought positions as instructors in colleges. The rapid progress in graduate studies in political science suggests a growing demand for courses in political science.

Three factors point to the growth in college enrollment and demand for political science faculty: (1) the influence of progressivism, (2) the role of government in public life, and (3) faith in science.

Economics and Sociology in Colleges: A Comparison with Political Science

A brief comparative historical analysis of the developments in the social sciences suggests that by the late nineteenth century, when industrialization and modernization were making inroads into American society, liberal and secular ideas were also taking hold. It was

during this period that the social sciences, mainly political science, sociology, and economics, also flourished in academia. Robert Bellah, et al. (1985) argue that developments in the social science disciplines were triggered by the new model of higher education that grew “contemporaneously with the rise of the business corporation” (p. 299).

Because the social science disciplines focused on the study of issues related to government, the economic system, and society--they were not immune from the major social questions of the time. Hence, the ideological polarization in society also found a fertile ground in academia. Ross (1991) characterizes this development as “the threat of socialism” (p. 98).

Of the three disciplines, economics--formerly known as political economy--was already an established academic discipline in American colleges (Tryon 1935; Ross 1991). For many decades, political economy was mostly taught as moral philosophy. However, as the demands of the industrial-corporate society were increasing, traditional curricula in colleges were no longer considered adequate. Bellah, et al. (1985) suggest that the “educational institutions were transformed in ways comparable to the transformation of other institutions” (p. 298).

In other words, developments in industrial organizations corresponded with developments in the social sciences in academia. Hence, the task before the social sciences was to provide a “useful knowledge about an increasingly complex society” (Bellah, et al. 1985, 299).

The advancement in industry created a need for verifiable data and information that the social sciences could produce in research universities. This socioeconomic reality sowed the seeds of specialization and professionalism in social sciences. In view of the social, political, and economic transformations that necessitated the creation of the modern social sciences, it was inevitable that the social science specialists and professionals held certain conceptions of American democracy and citizenship.

Whether they were economists, sociologists, or political scientists, social scientists raised normative questions and applied research methodologies for addressing them. Because the social sciences were essentially about the study of people and their behavior, one could argue that their assumptions and findings had serious implications for democracy.

Although as scientific academic disciplines, political science, economics, and sociology emerged during the Progressive era, economics had the longest presence in American colleges. Manicas (1987) points out that the first chair in political economy was established at King's College, now Columbia University, around 1786.

The early growth of American sociology took place at the University of Chicago in 1890s, when it created a new chair and appointed Albion Woodbury Small. Three years later, Small founded the *American Journal of Sociology*. Small also authored the first textbook of sociology (Manicas 1987, 224). Between the First and Second World Wars, the reform-minded Chicago School of Sociologists focused its research on the study of communities. In 1905, about fifty professional sociologists from twenty-one educational institutions met at Johns Hopkins University and founded the American Sociological Society.

In 1959, the American Sociological Society was given a new name: the American Sociological Association (hereinafter referred to as ASA). The ASA's mission was the scientific study of society. Over the course of the ASA's history, it has fostered the teaching of sociology in elementary and secondary schools. In the 1980s, the ASA developed a teaching services program focusing on curriculum and classroom instruction.

In one important respect, sociology was much more progressive in its orientation than economics and political science: "Sociologists also recruited significantly more women" (Ross 1991, 391). According to Ross, in the Progressive era, more women majored in sociology courses than they did in political science and economics (p. 158).

Women who studied sociology were interested in “charitable and reform activities” (Ross 1991, 102). Moreover, because university programs in political science and economics were usually of conservative orientations, they were not hospitable places for women. Ross maintains that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century social scientists projected a “masculine image” because they were seeking to “achieve realism, science, and professional standing” (p. 102).

Some studies show that women made a higher degree of scholarly contribution in sociology than they did in political science and economics. For example, Shulamit Reinharz (1993) of Brandeis University identifies about two dozen women sociologists who, between 1800 and 1945, made scholarly contributions to the field of sociology. Reinharz’s list of women sociologists includes Frances Wright, Jane Addams, and Margaret Mead.

Indeed, both Traditionalist political science and positivist economics were much behind sociology in opening their doors to women.

The APSA and Teaching of Political Science in Colleges

The formation of the APSA in 1903 signified that political scientists were surely determined to secure a separate status for political science courses in colleges. Indeed, by introducing political science as an autonomous discipline, they were determined to legitimize Traditionalism as a systematic approach to the study of the state.

In its first official meeting in 1904, one of the APSA’s founders and first treasurer, W. W. Willoughby (1904), announced that the formation of the APSA was “undoubtedly the most important event which has occurred in the history of the scientific study of matters political in this country” (p. 109). For Willoughby, the formation of the APSA was a turning point for political science in that the new learned society would promote the professional interests of its members. Willoughby and his associates understood the pulse of the time, were inspired by the

advances science had made in other walks of life, and were willing to emulate methods from the natural sciences for the study of the state.

At this point, it seems that political scientists had prepared to dissociate themselves from the moral sciences and moral philosophies of the late nineteenth century. Subsequently, their new sources of inspiration and insight included the modern theories of evolution via Darwin and Herbert Spencer, as well as developments in psychology via Sigmund Freud and William James.

All this seemed rational on their part because new discoveries in science commanded respect and, therefore, by practicing science, political scientists sought respectability for their trade. Of course, in 1904, what Willoughby meant by “the scientific study of matters political” by no means carried an identical meaning two or three decades later.

For example, in the late 1920s and 1930s, when the Chicago School emerged as a formidable intellectual force in political science, it simply parted ways with the work of APSA’s founders. Whereas the APSA founders’ focus was the systematic study of the state and its organs, in the Behavioralist approach of the Chicago School, the state was nowhere to be seen in their equations.

Political scientists’ time-honored enthusiasm for and commitment to the study of the state had simply vanished. Describing this change in focus in 1939, political scientist William Anderson, then a professor at the University of Minnesota, wrote, “American political science stands today reoriented somewhat away from the contemplation of the state and its sovereignty, and toward the actual political processes and the political behavior and motivation of man” (Anderson 1939, 265). As a subject of study, the state was losing its allure for political scientists.

The APSA and its member body made the demand that political science be made a separate department in colleges and universities. By 1914, after one decade of the APSA’s

existence and struggle for a separate identity in academia, the number of separate departments of political science in 300 institutions had gone up to thirty-eight (Anderson 1939).

In eighty-nine institutions, political science was combined with history and economics. In forty-five institutions, political science and sociology were combined. In twenty-one institutions, political science was combined with history, economics, and sociology. Nonetheless, the process of separation between political science and other disciplines continued in later years. By the time of the First World War, political science was widely taught in colleges and universities (Waldo 1975).

Traditionalism, the APSA, and Pre-collegiate Instruction in Government

In 1903, due to “diverging interests, compounded by rising professionalism,” Traditionalist political scientists departed from the womb of the American Historical Association (AHA), and founded the APSA as an independent learned society (Ross 1991, 283).

Traditionalist political scientists followed the footsteps of their mother organization. With their strong state-centric orientations, they set out to do for the teaching of political science what historians had been doing for instruction in history: they sought to popularize instruction in government in schools.

This is not to suggest that the APSA introduced the government-related courses in schools. Indeed, as Rolla M. Tryon (1935) suggests, by 1900-01, about 20 percent of all students in both public and private high schools in the United States were enrolled in government-related courses (p. 284). Government-related courses and textbooks that carried a variety of labels, including civics, community civics, and government, were in use. Nonetheless, most of these textbooks contained materials from political science.

Some of the APSA’s prominent officials, such as W. W. Willoughby, had also authored textbooks on civics and government. Tryon mentions twenty high school textbooks containing

political science material, which were in use at the time of the birth of the APSA. Nonetheless, as the APSA appeared on the horizon, like the AHA, it also wanted clients in the pre-collegiate environment to promote its Traditionalist conception of citizenship and citizenship education. As an independent learned society, the APSA wanted to secure its monopoly over the construction of knowledge beyond college campuses by firmly defining the parameters of curriculum and instruction in government in schools.

The APSA's conception of citizenship and citizenship education was in conflict with the historians' conception in that political scientists "were centrally concerned with contemporary politics, [and] most historians, whether descended from the belles-lettristic tradition or simply engrossed in the demands of the Rankean reconstruction of the past, were not" (Ross 1991, 283). Neither of the two presented an activist and participatory conception of citizenship, however. The APSA considered the schools as places where a diluted version of political science could be taught to students so that upon arrival to colleges as freshmen, they would face little difficulty in understanding the advanced disciplinary concepts. That was one reason, as Tryon (1935) argues, the APSA paid "considerable attention to political science in schools below the college" (p. 39).

Starting in 1903, under Goodnow's presidency, the APSA appointed a Committee of Instruction in Political Science. Professor William A. Schaper of University of Minnesota was appointed as the section chair. The section administered a test in various colleges to find what students knew about their government (APSA 1906, 207-28). In 1905, Schaper presented his report "What Do Students Know About Government Before Taking College Courses in Political Science?" at the APSA annual meeting. Indeed, this was political scientists' first organized foray into the business of citizenship education in schools.

Schaper's report was seminal in the APSA's decision to take an active part in fostering the teaching of government in schools. As the APSA reports indicate, in different decades of

the twentieth century, the APSA made several more attempts to influence school curricula with respect to the teaching of government. However, gradually, the APSA's enthusiasm in this matter was watered down. By the end of the Second World War, as Traditionalism was in retreat in the APSA, so was the APSA's organizational interest in instruction in government in schools.

After the Second World War, the APSA continued its residual school-related activities by setting up committees, subcommittees, and task forces; and holding conferences for the purpose of examining school curricula, creating instructional materials, training teachers, and making recommendations for improving instruction in government. Several philanthropic agencies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, funded the APSA activities, which included collaboration with the National Council for the Social Studies to produce guides for social studies teachers.

As Traditionalism slowly faded away as a dominant paradigm, the APSA's verve for the teaching of government in schools also ended.

Anti-Traditionalists in the APSA

In the early days of the APSA, some voices in the Association dissented from Traditionalism. One such voice was that of political scientist Henry Jones Ford. Only two years after the APSA was formed, Ford frowned on Traditionalism as a self-serving and misguided ideology.

In "The Scope of Political Science," Ford challenged Traditionalists' core assumptions about the significance of the state for citizenship and their claims of a scientific study of the state (APSA 1905, 198-206). Ford argued that Traditionalists restricted the scope of political science either by giving a technical meaning to the term "political" or to the term "the state" (Ford 1905, 198). He criticized the work of the founding fathers of political science for being culture-specific in their definitions of "political" and "the state." He asserted that since the

epistemology of political science was the product of European experiences, it could not have a universal validity.

In Ford's view, the state was conceived and created under special European historical developments and represented only a particular phase in European history. Hence, the state could not be a concept that had an all-encompassing temporal and spatial application.

Ford's critique of John Burgess was that Burgess held the state to be the permanent and universal condition of human nature, but that he restricted the definition of the state to a selected area of the world—i.e. Europe and North America—and excluded non-European states. According to Ford, such conceptualization meant that the scope of political science could not extend to all times and places. Hence, political science was not a science. Moreover, Ford rejected political scientists' claim that their field represented objective laws. Ford raised the pertinent question that, according to history, because "every succeeding form of political structure has seemed final to the people who lived under it, how can we be sure that the form which political science now takes as its objective reality is an exception to the rule? May it not be transitory like the rest?" (p. 201).

Ford concluded that the most salient fact of modern history was the instability of political systems. He argued that in Europe, since 1814, every state had changed either in its political or social organization. Thus, Ford noted, "upon my broad survey of events the national, popular state itself is found to be in a condition of metamorphosis" (1905, 201).

In other words, Ford challenged the Traditionalists' use of the state as a unit of analysis in their methods of investigation. He argued that political science was race-specific and not a universal science by arguing that "we have come to realize that when we speak of the principles of political science, what we really mean is general observations based upon the race-experience of a group of peoples whose culture rests upon the Greco-Roman foundations" (Ford 1905, 203).

Moreover, he suggested that political scientists gathered their concepts from the “mental deposits of our own race experience” (Ford 1905, 201). By this, Ford meant that, since the historical political development in Europe was unique, the experiences of its people were also different from the experiences of peoples living outside Europe.

Ford’s scathing critique came at the time when Traditionalists had just founded the APSA and were thinking about launching a movement for the advancement of their state-centric perspective by promoting instruction in government in schools. Ford’s dissentious criticism of the epistemology of political science was insightful: he questioned the core assumptions of the discipline. It appears that his critical article in *Proceedings*, the first official journal of the APSA, drew little interest from Traditionalists. Nonetheless, about six decades later, a similar but more effective revolt in the APSA, the Caucus for New Political Science, echoed Ford’s prescient voice that undermined the supremacy of Traditionalism.

Conclusion

As an academic discipline American political science has a checkered history. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Prussian-educated political scientists, including Francis Lieber, introduced a state-centric paradigm in the discipline of political science that may be called Traditionalism. The Prussian-educated scholars’ worldviews were shaped by European political and historical experiences. In 1903, when political scientists dissociated themselves from American Historical Association (AHA), they founded American Political Science Association (APSA), a learned society that promoted Traditionalism. Scholars who espoused Traditionalism studied the state and promoted the ideology of the primacy of the state; their research agenda hardly included issues such as gender equity, racial equality, social justice, and other significant social issues of the time. Traditionalists promoted their *sui generis* worldview on college campuses as well as in public schools in the form of teaching about the

structure and functions of government labeling it as citizenship education. In other words, good citizens should be knowledgeable about the political system under which they lived. However, with the advancement of knowledge in social sciences during the 1920s and early 1930s, Traditionalist paradigm lost its respectability among the new generation of political scientists.

Professor Charles E. Merriam, a prominent professor at University of Chicago, found Traditionalist paradigm to be an inadequate methodology for explaining complex political problems of a modern industrial democracy. Although Traditionalism faced opposition from some members of the American Political Science Association, academicians who were not political scientists, such as John Dewey, also attacked Traditionalists for supporting the status quo and for being detached from the social and political realities. Hence Traditionalist paradigm lost its intellectual relevance in academia and was replaced by a new paradigm known as Behavioralism.

What were the implications of Traditionalism for citizenship education in schools and colleges in general and for strengthening democracy in particular are some of the questions that warrant further research. Needless to say, Traditionalist paradigm was informed by Hegelian philosophy that postulated the primacy of the state at the expense of civil society. The state was presented as a masculine institution that protected its citizens and therefore must be revered by all citizens. The state provided a security umbrella under which citizens flourished. Also, Traditionalism posited that the state was a by-product of history and had a moral foundation for its existence, and also that without the state an individual's true existence is incomplete. Indeed, such philosophical thinking in Germany and elsewhere on the European continent was ubiquitous but had little resemblance with the American political experience.

One could argue that Traditionalists succeeded in Americanizing the Hegelian dogma on college campuses and in the public school curriculum. However, such worldview promoted a jaundiced conception of democracy and citizenship education—a conception that may be

called a warrior model or a cardboard model of citizenship. In such a conception, the state is viewed as a father figure and citizens are viewed as passive children with few participation skills. It is therefore not surprising that several decades of research data consistently show apathy among American youth toward active participation in the civic life.

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